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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to deliberate on the subject of nsider trading 
that is viewed as a fi nancial crime as well as to identify major factors 
that can contribute to reducing it. In this case, this research is focuses on 
investigation of companies’ acquisition announcements, which are listed 
from the traded volumes of Bursa Malaysia between 2008 and 2011. The 
study useda sample of considered thirty companies and their acquisition 
announcements are analyzed by examining their Average Cumulative 
Abnormal Volume Traded (ACAVT) to identify probable insider trading 
activities. The study affi rms consequently, stronger laws, effective rules and 
regulations are recognized as effi cient approaches to controlling insider 
trading at the fi nancial markets, while the infl uencing factors on insider 
trading would be suggested as the proposed conceptual model for further 
research.
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Introduction
Financial crime usually involves fraud in various forms like corporate fraud, 
purported to occur in public or commercial sectors. It is the consequence 
of individuals or companies are taking advantage illegally as long as there 
are weaknesses to be exploited (Gottschalk, 2010). Hence, defi ciencies that 
derive setbacks to controlling insider trading serve to illustrate the necessity 
of a effective laws to protect powerless or uninformed individuals.
Illegal insider trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, in 
breach of a fi duciary duty or other relationship of trust and confi dence, while 
in possession of material, nonpublic information about the said security (the 
U.S Security and Exchange Commission). According to a study by Fama 
(1991), market effi ciency proposition argues that one cannot consistently 
obtain returns higher than average market return on a risk-adjusted basis 
by considering public information at the time of investment and insider 
trading violates this proposition. Chae (2005) believed that insiders have 
informational advantages with respect to other fi nancial market players. The 
benefi ts of taking advantage of accessed information lead to asymmetric 
distribution of information among investors; so the market will be ineffi cient 
while some (insider traders) have the potential to gain abnormal returns 
on their investments at the expense of normal investors. This skewed deal 
creates a danger of huge investment loss. In this regard, an increase the 
number of insider traders in the market causes to leave the normal investors 
with moral hazard and decrease investors’ confi dence in the market (Cho 
& Shaub, 1991).
Insider trading not only affects the fi nancial market but also has impacts on 
corporations. According to Schafer & Ott (1992), insider trading discourages 
the corporation from positive investments, while insiders (e.g. managers) 
are allowed to get profi t from the corporation’s changing fortune. Managers 
that practice insider trading are more willing to choose risky investments 
to benefi t from violent fl uctuations in the fi rm’s stock price. In this case, 
shareholders who are aware of this situation would be less supportive of 
further capital expenditure of the fi rm, which leads to the fi rm’s direct 
investment to fall below its optimal level.
MAR Vol. 13 No.2 Dec 2014.indd   126 2/12/2015   10:33:06 AM
127
THE PROBABLE FACTORS OF INSIDER TRADING IN MALAYSIAN FIRMS
Moreover, insider trading has been existed in fi nancial markets as long as 
stock markets have been in operation, but insider trading laws did not exist 
prior to Black Tuesday and the Great Depression in the United States (Herzel 
& Katz, 1987). Hence, there are initiatives in the countries to develop laws 
against insider trading.  The study on insider trading has become a globally 
concerned topic to curtail this practice. The level of this concern is clear by 
rapid implementation of insider trading laws. Along this line, the number 
of countries that adopted this law before 1990 is only 34; but this number 
has increased to 87 by 2000 (Bhattacharya & Daouk, 2002). Nowadays, 
the vast majority of nations that possess organized securities markets have 
laws regulating insider trading and it is well developed in some countries 
like the United States, that is believed to have the most effective insider 
trading regulation in the world.
Insider trading law governance in Malaysia dates back to 1965 when 
in section 132A and 132B of the Companies Act this practice became 
prohibited. Part H, Chapter 9 of the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Berhad also mentions insider trading as an illegal action. Under 
division 2 (Section 89-89P) in part IX of the Malaysian Securities Industries 
Act 1983, insider trading in its unlawful meaning is prohibited; considered 
as a crime and an insider defi ned as:
- 89E: A person is an insider if that person;
1. Possesses information that is not generally available which on 
becoming generally available a reasonable person would expect it to 
have a material effect on the price or the value of securities; and
2. Knows or ought reasonably to know that the information is not 
generally available.
Although insider-trading laws prohibit this action but the evidences of 
ongoing insider trading is troubling the investors mind. Current Malaysian 
law is generally considered as adequate in prohibiting insider-trading 
activities but the enforcement is not quite as satisfactory. Consequently, the 
prohibiting nature of insider trading laws demand more power and intention 
to implement them in order to reach and maintain a highly reliable and 
sound fi nancial market (Kadir & Muhamad, 2012).
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Insider trading usually occurs prior to price sensitive announcements such 
as mergers and acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions by any initial reason 
affect the stock price of companies’ especially the stock price of the target 
Company. With the knowledge that stock price of the target fi rm will 
increase by an announcement, insiders may engage in purchasing stocks 
of the target company secretly (Bender & Ward, 2005). Therefore, insider 
trading may increase the cost of takeover for bidder company at shareholders 
expense. This research only targets to study companies to fi nd probable 
insider activities. 
The novelty of this study is to probe the following research objectives:
Objective 1: To explore probable insider trading in the Malaysian stock 
market prior to acquisition announcements.
Objective 2: To determine the factors that serve to decrease the level of 
insider trading in Malaysian fi rms.
Event study is the method that is used to analyze the collected data. This 
method averages cumulative performance of stocks within the study period, 
while time (period) before and after the event has to be specifi ed. The actual 
announcement day of acquisition is used to design an event window and 
the Average Cumulative Abnormal Volume Traded (ACAVT) is calculated 
to reveal probable insider trading activity in the sample.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an 
over view of insider trading literature. Section 3 is about methodology 
of the research and section 4 provides analysis and results. Section 5 is 
concludes the paper.
Literature 
Debate over insider trading has a long history and there is still no agreement 
among researchers on whether insider trading harms fi nancial markets 
and shareholders or it is instead benefi cial. Generally, two views take 
fundamental debates on insider trading, which are impact of insider trading 
over the economy such as information quality and legal theories on insider 
trading like the soundness and fairness of fi nancial markets.
MAR Vol. 13 No.2 Dec 2014.indd   128 2/12/2015   10:33:06 AM
129
THE PROBABLE FACTORS OF INSIDER TRADING IN MALAYSIAN FIRMS
Manne (1966) opened the debate over insider trading when he suggested 
that agency problems that shareholders and managers’ face will be 
diminished if insiders were permitted to trade and profi t from their own 
fi nancial activities. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that deregulation 
of insider trading will lead to improvements in corporate decision-making; 
therefore, increasing fi rm value. Additionally, other researchers argued that 
insider trading increased effi ciency in market information by releasing 
inside information (Jhon& Lang, 1991;Chau &Vayanos, 2008). Insider 
trading advocates believe that trades by insiders give signals to the market 
to prove or disprove rumors or information through corporations’ public 
announcements (Chau & Vayanos, 2008).
Advocates of insider trading regulation on the other hand generally 
question fundamental arguments of deregulators. Regulators argue that 
there is no empirical evidence to show that deregulation of insider trading 
is the most effi cient method of compensation for managers (Bainbridge, 
1986). Regulators claim that the ability of managers to purchase stock limit 
managers compensation; therefore, compensation does not depend on value 
of information or contribution of information but on wealth. Thus, managers’ 
ability to plan their own compensation is limited. 
In addition, regulators believe that the compensation completely depends 
on external factors like structure of capital market, the level of risk for 
specifi c fi rm and the amount of outsider sale in average (Schafer & Ott, 
1992). In addition, it cannot be ensured that the only producer of valuable 
information will be the only one who uses or takes advantage of it. For 
example, the manager, who creates news in favor of the corporation, is not 
the only person who might benefi t from that news (Bainbridge, 1986). This 
issue leads to free-rider problem in unregulated insider trading.
Schafer and Ott (1992) argued that insider trading causes confl ict of interest 
between shareholders and managers. They believed that insider trading is 
harmful for the corporation since it motivates managers to give priority to 
their own profi t upon profi t maximization for shareholders. An insider trader 
might not work for the corporation’s best interests. Insider trading harms 
confi dence of investors, which leads to a drop in the liquidity of security 
market, thus decreasing market effi ciency (Fishman & Hagerty, 1992). 
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Read (2009) also argued for several reasons insider trading is an insidious 
activity and must be prohibited. A simple analysis of insider trading shows 
that early information receivers (insiders) have more rewards on their 
trading. However, four additional outcomes or features of insider trading 
can be mentioned that damages the market place or reduces the economic 
welfare (Read, 2009). First is the riskiness that creates insider trading, 
which is opposed to the innate uncertainty that is typically priced into the 
stocks for any investment. Second, insider trading can derive loss for non-
insiders which is the profi t that insiders have from unrevealed information. 
Third, is the unfair nature of insider trading. With ongoing insider trading 
activity, profi ts are higher for insiders and normal investors gain less 
profi t, thus it depresses the rate of return in average for all investors in 
the stock market and makes it costly and diffi cult to raise capital for other 
investments. Finally, insider-trading activity in a market leads to the fl ight 
of good money from this market to a market with more transparency. This 
fl ight of investment and capital deters the market to make capital for other 
legal purposes.
 
Generally, effective laws and the effi cient practice of insider trading laws 
is considered as the most credible method to control this crime (Durnev & 
Nain, 2007). Kabir and Vermaelen (1996) found in their research that after 
the introduction of restriction laws on insider trading, which bans insiders 
from trading two months earlier than earning announcements, trading 
volume decreased while the value of specifi c companies did not change. 
Frijns, Gilbert, and Tourani-Rad (2007) found that stronger laws lead to 
lower cost of insider trading. In particular, they found broader laws; laws 
that employ fi nancial damage instead of criminal damage and laws that 
practiced stronger public regulation achieved the best results in controlling 
insider trading. Osaki (2009) believed that effective enforcement by the 
government is mandatory and critical to regulation of insider trading. 
Barnes (2011) argued that insider trading and market abuse are not even 
eliminated after insider trading law enforcement, but it continues at a high 
rate in the UK even though more provision and supervision on market are 
imposed through the Financial Services and Market Act 2000 (FSMA). 
Another issue that Barnes (2011) mentioned in his study is the lack of 
insider trading convictions in the UK. From 2005 till 2011, only 12 cases 
have been convicted in the UK while within this period, this rate in the US 
was 534 cases. This comparison magnifi es the importance of enforcement 
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in law execution and not just regulation of law. Thevenot (2012) mentions 
a decrease in insider trading, as manager’s perceived risk and punishment 
associated with detection of their illegal insider activity.
Various studies conducted on insider trading from different angles of 
this criminal activity expressed similar views. Although researchers are 
not unanimous on every single debated issue but collective wisdom and 
a majority of literatures discussed insider trading as a deceitful activity. 
The shortcomings in literature about insider trading in Malaysia and the 
importance of this issue encouraged us to conduct the current research. 
Effective regulation of this activity is highly recommended by researchers 
to control insider trading.
Methodology
The aim of this research is to uncover probable insider trading factors in the 
listed companies of Bursa Malaysia prior to acquisition announcements by 
investigation on the trading volumes of targeted companies.
The method of study in this research project is event study. Event study 
is founded on analysis of data and information around an event; in this 
particular research the event is acquisition announcements. Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen, and Roll (1969) are pioneers of the event study methodology. Many 
researchers focused on insider trading patterns prior to price sensitive 
announcements.  Keowen and Pinkerton (1981) found that market reaction 
to upcoming mergers occurs earlier than the fi rst public announcement. 
This reaction of the market is based on insider information. They showed 
that what could have been considered as a secret is traded in the market. 
However, their fi ndings support a semi strong form of market effi ciency 
hypothesis, as the majority of market reaction to merger completes a day 
after a public announcement.
An abnormal increase in trading volume turnover could be a sign for insider 
trading. Keowen and Pinkerton (1981) found that volume turnover increased 
as they approached the merger announcement. They mentioned that this 
increase in the amount of trading volume could be due to information leaked 
out. Meulbroek (1992) found that the volume turnover on days with insider 
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trading is higher than is expected. Another fi nding of Meulbroek (1992) 
is the responsibility of insiders for most of the abnormal trading volume. 
Ascioglu, McInish, and Wood (2002) found a noticeable increase in the 
volume of turnover in the 4 days prior to a merger announcement. Also, 
Clements and Singh (2011) examined the effect of takeover announcements 
on the trading patterns of targeted fi rms in the United States. They found a 
positive Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and positive abnormal trading 
volume prior to investigated cases of successful takeover announcements. 
The combination of these fi ndings leads them to conclude that informational 
asymmetry is likely to be occurring earlier than the offi cial announcement. 
Clements and Singh (2011) also mentioned that insider trading prior to a 
successful takeover announcement exists in the market. 
The literature provides a clue that insider trading has a positive relation with 
increase in trading volume. On the other hand, earlier researches stated that 
the likelihood of existing insider trading on approaching announcement day 
increases (Keowen & Pinkerton, 1981; Olmo et al., 2011). As abnormal 
volume turnover could be an indicator of probable insider trading activity, 
we test whether there is a signifi cant abnormal volume turnover in the 
sample prior to merger and acquisition announcements.
Olmo, Pilbeam, and Pouliot (2011) showed that a majority of possible insider 
trading appears about 25 days earlier than public announcement. Besides, 
they also mentioned that all price movements before the announcement of 
price sensitive information are not due to insider activities and instead to 
other factors such as market manipulation and large position taking before 
the announcement infl uenced them. For the current study, if average daily 
abnormal volume turnover (ACAVT) in 21 working days of the stock 
market prior to an acquisition announcement was above 0, we take it as 
an evidence of probable insider trading activity or leaked information by 
insiders in the studied sample.
The sampling approach is carried out in three steps as multistage sampling by 
considering probability sampling as simple random sampling and stratifi ed 
sampling. In the fi rst phase, all announcements of listed companies in KLSE 
are reviewed to sort out the companies that have merger and acquisition 
announcement between 2008 and 2011and as the number of mergers 
within the period is so low, this study focuses on acquisition cases. These 
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companies are the companies that have been the target of acquisition. In the 
next phase, these companies are sorted based on relevance to this study and 
availability of trading volume per day prior to acquisition announcement. 
Sorted out companies are analyzed in the third phase to determine probable 
insider trading.
To detect probable insider trading, 30 companies were chosen for further 
analysis. These 30 announcements took place between 01 April 2008 and 
17 October 2011. Data and information in the current study are secondary 
data that are publicly available. The data and information are obtained 
from online data sources and databases that are available such as Thomson 
Reuters data stream.
The actual announcement day of acquisition is used to design an event 
window and ACAVT would be calculated. The designated window for this 
study is 21 working days. The model of Chae (2005)  is employed in this 
study to measure traded volume and obtain trading days with abnormal 
trading volume.
1. The day of merger and acquisition announcement is considered as day 
0
2. Trading day after announcement is day 1 and consequently a trading 
day before is day -1
3. The Log Turnover is a logarithmic measure of traded volume per day 
divided to number of outstanding share
4. The Log Expected Turnover (EVT) is the mean of log turnover 
calculated for trading days t -84 to t -22 (It was 63 working days)
5. Abnormal Volume Turnover (AVT) is calculated from subtracting log 
expected turnover (EVT) from the log turnover. 
To calculate ACAVT, the pre-announcement day was designated from day 
t-21 to t-1. ACAVT is generated by averaging AVT over the designated 
period. 21working days are considered as 1 month, which is consistent with 
other studies that used the event study method. The total event designated 
window is 84 working days 
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Log Turnover:
߬ ݅, ݐ =  ݈݊( ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃  ܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁  ݅ ,ݐ
 ܱݑݐݏݐܽ݊݀݅݊݃  ݄ܵܽݎ݁ݏ  ݅ ,ݐ  
)                  (Equation 1)
Log Expected Turnover:
߬ ഥ݅, ݐ = (σ ߬ ݅ ,ݐ
ݐ= െ22
ݐ= െ84
63
)                 (Equation 2)
Abnormal Turnover (ߦi,t )  = Log turnover –Log Expected turnover
ߦ ݅, ݐ =  ߬ ݅, ݐ െ  ߬ҧ ݅, ݐ                 (Equation 3)
Average Daily Cumulative Abnormal Volume Turnover (ACAVT)
ܣܥܣܸܶ =   (σ ߦ  ݅ ,ݐ
ݐ= െ1
ݐ= െ21
21
)          (Equation 4)
i = the share of under study company
t = time of event (days)
The equations are assessed to analyze the collected data of companies for 
each announcement separately. The goal of the tests is to measure ACAVT 
and to fi nd whether ACAVT for each studied company is signifi cantly more 
than zero. If the value of ACAVT was signifi cantly more than zero, there is 
probable insider trading activity and vice versa.
Data Analysis and Results
The aim of this section is to evaluate probable insider trading activity prior 
to acquisition announcements in Bursa Malaysia. The data analysis is based 
on the work of Chae (2005) to get ACAVT of the data. 
Besides calculation of abnormal turnover of the sample to identify probable 
insider trading, graphs of trading volume for 84 working days prior to 
announcement (Figure1) day and abnormal turnover for 21 days prior to 
announcement (Figure 2) are constructed for the sample to have better 
understanding of the trading pattern. 21 working days are considered as 
a month and 84 days consequently as 4 months for the current study. The 
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trading volume graph (Figure 1) illustrates the trading pattern of the studied 
companies prior to announcement and it helps to have a vision of how the 
upcoming announcement infl uence trading. High trade volume days in 
trading volume graphs are also investigated to identify the motive or reason 
for that high trading volume in that particular day. This investigation was 
conducted to identify any kind of news or announcement that could infl uence 
investors to increase their trading volume. The graph for abnormal volume 
turnover (Figure 2) also shows abnormal returns for 21 days prior to the 
announcement. This graph clarifi es how many days within a working month 
prior to the announcement, abnormal turnover (probable insider trading) 
occurred.
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Figure 1:  Trading Volume for 84 Working Days of a Sample
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Figure 2:  Abnormal Volume Turnover for 21 Working Days of a Sample
The goal of the current study as an academic research is to investigate the 
level of probable insider trading in Bursa Malaysia Due to legal implications, 
the identifi cation of the studied companies would be kept  confi dential. To 
illustrate the method of analysis, we only described trading volume (Figure 
1), abnormal turnover (Figure 2) and calculated ACAVT for only one of 
the studied sample. 
In order to analyze the samples and calculate ACAVT, the trading volume 
event window for t-84 days and one day prior to announcement designated 
as t-1 is displayed in Figure 1. The vertical axis represents the daily volume 
traded in thousands and the horizontal axis represents the trading days. 
By visual inspection, the graph indicates large trading volumes in day’s 
t-4, t-14 and t-19. For these three high volume days, databases such as 
emerging market information service (EMIS), Bursa Malaysia’s website 
and the company’s website have been searched and there was no evidence 
of important news or any kind of announcement prior to these three days.
Figure 2 illustrates abnormal volume turnover (AVT) between day’s t-21 
and t-1 for the same studied sample. The vertical axis is represented as the 
level of abnormal turnover and it is derived from the difference between log 
MAR Vol. 13 No.2 Dec 2014.indd   136 2/12/2015   10:33:07 AM
137
THE PROBABLE FACTORS OF INSIDER TRADING IN MALAYSIAN FIRMS
turnover and log expected turnover. The horizontal axis is represented as 
focus days of study (one month window).  The AVT graph shows that there 
are consistent abnormal traded volumes occurring for the designated study 
period. Visual inspection of the AVT graph indicates increased appetite for 
stocks of studied sample.
Investigation into high traded volume days information wise did not indicate 
any specifi c reason behind the abnormal increase of trading volume and 
consistent abnormal trading volumes for the designated window. This points 
to a strong probability of insider trading activity in stocks of studied fi rm 
prior to the investigated acquisition announcement. However, it should be 
reminded that an increase in trading volume of a particular stock, encourage 
other investors to increase their trade on that particular stock; thus, a high 
trading volume could also have been due to this phenomena and the market 
perception of investors. Calculated cumulative abnormal trading volume 
traded (ACAVT) for this particular sample is signifi cantly above zero 
(3.040706156). Overall, the results derived from investigations revealed a 
high probability of insider trading in the studied sample.
As is clear in Table 1, 26.6 percent of analyzed acquisitions of fi rms that are 
listed by Bursa Malaysia have signifi cant ACAVT values higher than zero 
for the studied period and raises suspicion on fraud and fi nancial crime. 
These companies with the value of ACAVT higher than zero are companies 
with probable insider trading activity.
 
Table 1:  Results Of ACAVT from the Studied Firms in Bursa Malaysia
Signifi cant ACAVT 
above zero
(Observed)
Signifi cant ACAVT 
above zero
(Percentage)
Mean
ACAVT
SD
8 26.6 % 0.194557584 1.01801518
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Conclusion
This study investigated traded volumes of Bursa Malaysia listed companies 
with acquisition announcements to identify probable insider trading 
activities prior to offi cial announcements between 2008 and 2011. This 
research contributes to fi nancial market players, investors, auditors and 
researchers who are concerned with fi nancial fraud and insider trading. 
The objective of this research is to determine effi ciency and confi dence of 
the KLSE by investigating the presence of one subset of fi nancial crime 
(insider trading) prior to acquisition announcements. For this purpose, 30 
companies with published acquisition have been chosen to conduct sets of 
analysis on them.
The results from the calculation of ACAVT indicate that in 8 studied samples, 
elements of insider trading or information leaking are present. The calculated 
ACAVT ranged from the lowest value of - 1.4701 to the highest value of 
3.0407 for all samples. Besides calculated ACAVT, observations on traded 
volume and investigations to recover announcements from databases and 
information sources raised suspicion to the existence of fi nancial fraud in 
samples with high ACAVT. The fact that 26.6 % of acquisitions in Bursa 
Malaysia are suspected to have the possibility of fi nancial crime raises 
doubts about the effi ciency and transparency of this market. 
Insider trading activity decreases the effi ciency of the market, confi dence 
of investors and is considered as a value destroyer activity; therefore, close 
observation of the market and monitoring insiders’ activity prior to a merger 
or acquisition by Malaysian authorities is requisite. 
In summing up, as this study mainly is focused on volume turnover, 
researchers should be alerted that increases in the trading volume of a 
particular stock in a stock market encourage other investors to increase their 
deal on that particular stock respectively; thus, high trading volume could 
also been due to this phenomena and not just insider trading. Consequently, 
stronger laws, effective rules and regulations are recognized as effi cient 
approaches to controlling insider trading at the fi nancial markets. Therefore, 
the following model is proposed for further research.
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Figure 3:  Proposed Conceptual Model for Further Research
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